Markets and Politicians

Politicized economic choice

  • Arye L. Hillman

Part of the Studies in Public Choice book series (SIPC, volume 6)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvi
  2. Economic Policies and Political Motives

    1. Theoretical Perspectives

      1. Heinrich W. Ursprung
        Pages 1-25
      2. Joel M. Guttman
        Pages 27-41
      3. Wolfgang Mayer, Jun Li
        Pages 43-61
    2. Policy Choices

      1. Gordon Tullock
        Pages 93-112
  3. Markets and Socialism

    1. Market Socialism in Eastern Europe

    2. Transitionary Policies

      1. Marton Tardos
        Pages 179-188
      2. Arye L. Hillman
        Pages 189-207
    3. Economic Change in China

  4. International Economic Policy

    1. International Trade

      1. Robert E. Baldwin
        Pages 263-282
      2. James H. Cassing
        Pages 307-318
    2. International Monetary Transactions

About this book

Introduction

Arye L. Hillman There has been much economic theorizing directed at providing the politician with guidance in the design of policies that will amend market outcomes in ways that achieve specified efficiency or equity objectives. It has been common practice in economic models to portray the politician who implements the policy recommendations as a mechanistic individual who behaves as would a benevolent dictator to maximize a prespecified conception of social welfare or the utility of a representative consumer. The self-interest and discretion that is attributed to firms and consumers as optimizing agents is absent from the motives of such a politician. Economic policy choice is thereby depoliticized. How well depoliticized economic theory fares in explaining or predicting economic policy choice depends naturally enough upon how politicized is the economic system in which economic and political agents function. The papers in this volume recognize that politicians may exercise sufficient discretion so as not to behave mechanistically in correcting market inefficiencies or in pursuit of a somehow specified just income distribution. Since politicians are viewed as self-interested optimizing agents, just as are utility-maximizing consumers and profit-maximizing producers, the choice of economic policies is politicized. Coverage is provided of a broad spectrum of economic policy choice where markets and politicians interact. Section I is concerned with policy determination in western market economies, Section II with the introduction of markets into economies in transition from socialism, and Section III with international transactions.

Keywords

China Eastern Europe International Economic Policy Intervention Policy economic policy economy fiscal policy international trade political economy politics socialism taxation trade policy

Editors and affiliations

  • Arye L. Hillman
    • 1
  1. 1.Bar-Ilan UniversityIsrael

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-011-3882-6
  • Copyright Information Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-010-5728-8
  • Online ISBN 978-94-011-3882-6
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-4700
  • About this book