© 1993

Preferences and Democracy

Villa Colombella Papers

  • Albert Breton
  • Gianluigi Galeotti
  • Pierre Salmon
  • Ronald Wintrobe

Part of the International Studies in Economics and Econometrics book series (ISEE, volume 28)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Introduction

    1. Albert Breton, Gianluigi Galeotti, Pierre Salmon, Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 1-10
  3. Unsatisfied Political Demands

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 11-11
    2. Peter Howitt, Ronald Wintrobe
      Pages 41-64
  4. Bridges Between Demand and Supply

  5. Equilibrium Political Platforms: Convergence and Divergence

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 157-157
    2. Jean-Dominique Lafay
      Pages 159-191
    3. Gianluigi Galeotti
      Pages 193-213
  6. The Behaviour of Political Parties

  7. Redistribution

About this book


I. Until about a dozen years ago, the economic analysis of the relationship between political preferences and political demands was a rather straightforward, if dull, subject. The most common assumption was that the only political instrument available to citizens was the vote. Given this assumption, the analyst could express the outcome of the voting process in one of two ways. One possibility was to make the heroic assumptions necessary to obtain the median voter theorem, in which case, the political demands of the citizenry are simply the preferences of the median voter. The alternative was to make Arrow's Impossibility Theorem in which case even though individual preferences are well ordered, no collective preference function exists. On either of these approaches, institutions such as interest groups, political parties, or the structures ofpolitical representation played no role in the analysis. The work of "Chicago" scholars especially George Stigler, Gary Becker and Sam Peltzman took a different approach and emphasized the importanceoforganizationinmakingpoliticaldemandseffective, shifting thefocus from voting topolitical "pressure" byinterestgroups. However, in these models, voting as an instrument of political action simply disappears and the relationship between interest group pressures and electoral processes has never been clarified.


Institution Political Science Revolution economics equilibrium general equilibrium modeling welfare

Editors and affiliations

  • Albert Breton
    • 1
  • Gianluigi Galeotti
    • 2
  • Pierre Salmon
    • 3
  • Ronald Wintrobe
    • 4
  1. 1.University of TorontoCanada
  2. 2.University of PerugiaItaly
  3. 3.University of BourgogneFrance
  4. 4.University of Western OntarioCanada

Bibliographic information

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