The Logical Foundations of Statistical Inference

  • Henry E. KyburgJr.

Part of the Synthese Library book series (SYLI, volume 65)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-IX
  2. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 1-21
  3. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 22-60
  4. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 61-75
  5. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 76-93
  6. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 94-128
  7. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 129-155
  8. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 156-186
  9. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 187-215
  10. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 216-246
  11. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 247-285
  12. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 286-313
  13. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 314-327
  14. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 328-347
  15. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 348-356
  16. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 357-369
  17. Henry E. Kyburg Jr.
    Pages 370-391
  18. Back Matter
    Pages 392-433

About this book

Introduction

Everyone knows it is easy to lie with statistics. It is important then to be able to tell a statistical lie from a valid statistical inference. It is a relatively widely accepted commonplace that our scientific knowledge is not certain and incorrigible, but merely probable, subject to refinement, modifi­ cation, and even overthrow. The rankest beginner at a gambling table understands that his decisions must be based on mathematical ex­ pectations - that is, on utilities weighted by probabilities. It is widely held that the same principles apply almost all the time in the game of life. If we turn to philosophers, or to mathematical statisticians, or to probability theorists for criteria of validity in statistical inference, for the general principles that distinguish well grounded from ill grounded generalizations and laws, or for the interpretation of that probability we must, like the gambler, take as our guide in life, we find disagreement, confusion, and frustration. We might be prepared to find disagreements on a philosophical and theoretical level (although we do not find them in the case of deductive logic) but we do not expect, and we may be surprised to find, that these theoretical disagreements lead to differences in the conclusions that are regarded as 'acceptable' in the practice of science and public affairs, and in the conduct of business.

Keywords

conditional decision theory foundation interpret probability subject

Authors and affiliations

  • Henry E. KyburgJr.
    • 1
  1. 1.University of RochesterUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-010-2175-3
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1974
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-277-0430-6
  • Online ISBN 978-94-010-2175-3
  • About this book