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Judgement and the Epistemic Foundation of Logic

  • Maria van der Schaar

Part of the Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science book series (LEUS, volume 31)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvii
  2. Constructivism, Judgement and Reason

  3. Judgement and Reason in the Seventeenth Century

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 37-37
    2. Della Rocca Michael
      Pages 49-65
  4. Kant, Neo-Kantianism, and Bolzano

  5. Husserl, Frege and Russell

About this book

Introduction

This compelling reevaluation of the relationship between logic and knowledge affirms the key role that the notion of judgement must play in such a review. The commentary repatriates the concept of judgement in the discussion, banished in recent times by the logical positivism of Wittgenstein, Hilbert and Schlick, and the Platonism of Bolzano. The volume commences with the insights of Swedish philosopher Per Martin-Löf, the father of constructive type theory, for whom logic is a demonstrative science in which judgement is a settled feature of the landscape. His paper opens the first of four sections that examine, in turn, historical philosophical assessments of judgement and reason; their place in early modern philosophy; the notion of judgement and logical theory in Wolff, Kant and Neo-Kantians like Windelband; their development in the Husserlian phenomenological paradigm; and the work of Bolzano, Russell and Frege. The papers, whose authors include Per Martin-Löf, Göran Sundholm, Michael Della Rocca and Robin Rollinger, represent a finely judged editorial selection highlighting work on philosophers exercised by the question of whether or not an epistemic notion of judgement has a role to play in logic. The volume will be of profound interest to students and academicians for its application of historical developments in philosophy to the solution of vexatious contemporary issues in the foundation of logic. ​

Keywords

Bolzano and analytic truth Bolzano and conceptual truth Brentano on states of affairs Conception of mathematics Concepts of knowledge Constructions and proofs Constructive type theory and analyticity Constructive type theory and logical positivism Constructive type theory and unanswerable questions Epistemic rules and Descartes Frege, Russell and the assertion sign Heying and assertion History of Logic Husserl on states of affairs Judgement and Bolzano Judgement and Descartes Judgement and Frege Judgement and Husserl Judgement and Kant Judgement and Per Martin-Löf Judgement and Russell Judgement and Spinoza Judgement and Windelband Judgement and Wolff Judgement and reason Judgement and the epistemic foundation of logic Judgement and the principle of sufficient reason Stump on states of affairs Theory of Judgement Windelband and Brentano Wolff and Kant judgement and ground

Editors and affiliations

  • Maria van der Schaar
    • 1
  1. 1., Institute of PhilosophyLeiden UniversityLeidenNetherlands

Bibliographic information