Evolutionary Psychology and the Propositional-attitudes

Two Mechanist Manifestos

  • Alex Walter

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

About this book

Introduction

The two essays provide a critical examination of theory and research in the field of evolutionary psychology. The view advanced here is that philosophical materialism and minimalist assumptions about adaptation serve Darwinian psychology better than the more popular alternative view that relies on cognitive dualism and propositional-attitude psychology to formulate evolutionary psychology theory. A commitment to cognitive dualism is destined to undermine the physical basis of behavior upon which evolutionary theory depends. Many evolutionary psychologists do not see this but are seduced by the easy way in which hypotheses can be formulated using the ‘propositional-attitude’ model. The challenge is to develop a materialistic and mechanistic approach to understanding human cognition and behavior, including linguistic and social behavior.

Keywords

Propositional-attitudes evo-devo evolutionary psychology mind/body dualism modularity motivation

Authors and affiliations

  • Alex Walter
    • 1
  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNew BrunswickUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-007-2969-8
  • Copyright Information The Authors 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
  • Print ISBN 978-94-007-2968-1
  • Online ISBN 978-94-007-2969-8
  • Series Print ISSN 2211-4548
  • Series Online ISSN 2211-4556
  • About this book