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Advances in Mathematical Economics

  • Shigeo Kusuoka
  • Toru Maruyama

Part of the Advances in Mathematical Economics book series (MATHECON, volume 2)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-v
  2. Research Articles

  3. Back Matter
    Pages 161-164

About this book

Introduction

The role of asymmetric information in allocation of resources, together with the associated information-revelation process, has long been a central focus of economic research. While the bulk of the literature addresses these is­ sues within the framework of principal-agent relationship, which essentially reduces the problem to the sole principal's (the sole Stackelberg leader's) optimization problem subject to the agents' (the Stackelberg followers') re­ sponses, there are recent attempts to extend analysis to other economic setups characterized by different relationships among decision-makers. A notable strand of such attempts is the core analysis of incomplete in­ formation. Here, there is no Stackelberg-type relationship, and more impor­ tantly the players can talk to each other for coordinated choice of strategies. See, e.g., Wilson (1978) for a pioneering work; Yannelis (1991) for formula­ tion of feasibility of a strategy as its measurability; Ichiishi and Idzik (1996) for introduction of Bayesian incentive-compatibility to this strand; Ichiishi, Idzik and Zhao (1994) for information revelation (that is, endogenous deter­ mination of updated information structures); Ichiishi and Radner (1997) and Ichiishi and Sertel (1998) for studies of a specific model of Chandler's firm in multidivisional form for sharper results; and Vohra (1999) for a recent work. It is a common postulate in these works that every player takes part in design of a mechanism and also in execution of the signed contract.

Keywords

agents economics efficiency mathematical economics sets

Editors and affiliations

  • Shigeo Kusuoka
    • 1
  • Toru Maruyama
    • 2
  1. 1.Graduate School of Mathematical SciencesUniversity of TokyoMeguro-ku, TokyoJapan
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsKeio UniversityMinato-ku, TokyoJapan

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-4-431-67909-7
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Tokyo 2000
  • Publisher Name Springer, Tokyo
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-4-431-65933-4
  • Online ISBN 978-4-431-67909-7
  • Series Print ISSN 1866-2226
  • Series Online ISSN 1866-2234
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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