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Social Dilemmas and Cooperation

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 1994

Overview

Editors:
  1. Ulrich Schulz

    1. Abteilung für Psychologie, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

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  2. Wulf Albers

    1. Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

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  3. Ulrich Mueller

    1. ZUMA, Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Mannheim, Germany

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Table of contents (24 papers)

  1. Front Matter

    Pages I-X
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  2. Social orientation analysis of the common and individual interest problems

    • Toshiaki Doi
    Pages 1-23

  3. Toward more locomotion in experimental games

    • Paul A. M. van Lange
    Pages 25-43

  4. Individual reasoning process in the participation game with period

    • Tetsuo Takigawa
    Pages 45-53

  5. The position effect: The role of a player’s serial position in a resource dilemma game

    • Ramzi Suleiman, David V. Budescu, Amnon Rapoport
    Pages 55-73

  6. Positive and negative mood effects on solving a resource dilemma

    • Regina Vollmeyer
    Pages 75-98

  7. Fairness judgements in an asymmetric public goods dilemma

    • Jeffrey A. Joireman, D. Michael Kuhlman, Hidetaka Okuda
    Pages 99-116

  8. Group size effects in social dilemmas: A review of the experimental literature and some new results for one-shot N-PD games

    • Axel Franzen
    Pages 117-146

  9. Provision of step-level public goods: Effects of different information structures

    • Amnon Rapoport, Ido Erev
    Pages 147-171

  10. Conditional contributions and public good provision

    • Eric van Dijk, Henk Wilke
    Pages 173-185

  11. Convergence in the orange grove: Learning processes in a social dilemma setting

    • Ido Erev
    Pages 187-206

  12. Leadership and group identity as determinants of resource consumption in a social dilemma

    • Margaret Foddy, Andrew Crettenden
    Pages 207-232

  13. Prisoner’s dilemma networks: Selection strategy versus action strategy

    • Toshio Yamagishi, Nahoko Hayashi, Nobuhito Jin
    Pages 233-250

  14. Choice of strategies in social dilemma supergames

    • Motoki Watabe, Toshio Yamagishi
    Pages 251-267

  15. Social dilemmas exist in space

    • Andrzej Nowak, Bibb Latane, Maciej Lewenstein
    Pages 269-289

  16. Commuting by car or by public transportation? An interdependence theoretical approach

    • Mark van Vugt, Ree M. Meertens, Paul A. M. van Lange
    Pages 291-309

  17. Evolution of norms without metanorms

    • Toshio Yamagishi, Nobuyuki Takahashi
    Pages 311-326

  18. Computer simulations of the relation between individual heuristics and global cooperation in prisoner’s dilemmas

    • David M. Messick, Wim B. G. Liebrand
    Pages 327-340

  19. What risk should a selfish partner take in order to save the life of a non-relative, selfish friend? A stochastic game approach to the prisoner’s dilemma

    • Ilan Eshel, Daphna Weinshall, Emilia Sansone
    Pages 341-355

  20. Learning models for the prisoner’s dilemma game: A review

    • Hans Christoph Micko
    Pages 357-374
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Keywords

About this book

A social dilemma is a game which at first glance has only inefficient solutions. If efficient solutions are to be achieved, some kind of cooperation among the players is required. This book asks two basic questions, closely intertwined with each other: 1. How is cooperation possible among rational players in such a social dilemma? Which changes in the social context of a social dilemma situation are necessary in order for players to rationally choose the cooperative option? 2. How do real players actually behave in social dilemma situations? Do they behave "rationally" at all? Or, conversely, what kind of reasoning, attitudes, emotions, etc. shape the behavior of real players in social dilemmas? What kind of interventions, what kind of internal mechanisms within a real group may change players' willingness to cooperate? These two general questions mark the broad spectrum of the problem which has been, over the last three decades, investigated in various disciplines, and which has brought many new ideas and new observations into the study of the old question of social order in a world of born egoists. Accordingly, this volume contains contributions by biologists, sociologists, political scientists, economists, mathematicians, psychologists, and philosophers.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Abteilung für Psychologie, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

    Ulrich Schulz

  • Institut für Mathematische Wirtschaftsforschung, Universität Bielefeld, Bielefeld, Germany

    Wulf Albers

  • ZUMA, Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und Analysen, Mannheim, Germany

    Ulrich Mueller

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