Elections, Voting Rules and Paradoxical Outcomes

  • William V. Gehrlein
  • Dominique Lepelley

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xiv
  2. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 1-25
  3. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 27-57
  4. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 59-83
  5. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 85-115
  6. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 117-140
  7. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 141-160
  8. William V. Gehrlein, Dominique Lepelley
    Pages 161-183

About this book

Introduction

This monograph studies voting procedures based on the probability that paradoxical outcomes like the famous Condorcet Paradox might exist. It is well known that hypothetical examples of many different paradoxical election outcomes can be developed, but this analysis examines factors that are related to the process by which voters form their preferences on candidates that will significantly reduce the likelihood that such voting paradoxes will ever actually be observed. It is found that extreme forms of voting paradoxes should be uncommon events with a small number of candidates. Another consideration is the propensity of common voting rules to elect the Condorcet Winner, which is widely accepted as the best choice as the winner, when it exists. All common voting rules are found to have identifiable scenarios for which they perform well on the basis of this criterion. But, Borda Rule is found to consistently work well at electing the Condorcet Winner, while the other voting rules have scenarios where they work poorly or have a very small likelihood of electing a different candidate than Borda Rule. The conclusions of previous theoretical work are presented in an expository format and they are validated with empirically-based evidence. Practical implications of earlier studies are also developed.

Keywords

Voting Voting rules Elections Election procedures Social choice Condorcet's Paradox Voting paradox Voting rules

Authors and affiliations

  • William V. Gehrlein
    • 1
  • Dominique Lepelley
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Business AdministrationUniversity of DelawareNewarkUSA
  2. 2.University of La RéunionSaint-Denis, Ile de La RéunionFrance

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-64659-6
  • Copyright Information Springer International Publishing AG 2017
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-64658-9
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-64659-6
  • Series Print ISSN 1614-0311
  • Series Online ISSN 2197-8530
  • About this book
Industry Sectors
Finance, Business & Banking
Materials & Steel
Consumer Packaged Goods