Overview
Demonstrates how the philosophical implications of Copernicus’ insight are directly opposed to Kant’s transcendental philosophy
Argues for scientific realism by means of transcendental proof
Explores how Kant strayed from the ‘secure path of a science’ to propose a novel but ultimately untenable philosophical theory
Includes supplementary material: sn.pub/extras
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Table of contents (9 chapters)
Keywords
About this book
This book offers a comprehensive critique of the Kantian principle that ‘objects conform to our cognition’ from the perspective of a Copernican world–view which stands diametrically opposed to Kant’s because founded on the principle that our cognition conforms to objects. Concerning both Kant’s ontological denial in respect of space and time and his equivalence thesis in respect of ‘experience’ and ‘objectivity’, Ryall argues that Kant’s transcendental idealism signally fails to account for the one thing that is essential for Copernicus and the only thing that would validate a comparison between his and Kant’s critical philosophy, namely the subject as ‘revolving object’. It is only by presupposing – in a transcendentally realistic sense – that human beings exist as physical things in themselves, therefore, that the ‘observer motion’ of Copernican theory is vindicated and the distorted nature of our empirical observations explained. In broadly accessible prose and by directly challenging the arguments of many stalwart defenders of Kant including Norman Kemp Smith, Henry E. Allison and Michael Friedman, Ryall’s book will be of interest to both scholars and students of Kant’s philosophy alike.
Reviews
“Ryall puts the case that Kant's much touted 'Copernican Revolution' in philosophy was in fact no such thing but rather just the opposite, i.e., not a progressive turn toward truth, science, and objectivity but a turn back toward just the kind of anthropocentric/subjectivist illusions that Copernicus (and Galileo after him) had striven to overcome. He argues this case with impressive determination, vigour and consistency in a prose-style which often serves well to communicate his deeply held conviction that Kant's big mistake - his way of confusing ontological with epistemological issues - has inflicted great damage on subsequent philosophy.” (Christopher Norris, Cardiff University, UK)
Authors and Affiliations
About the author
J. T. W. Ryall teaches philosophy at Cardiff University, UK. This is his first book.
Bibliographic Information
Book Title: A Copernican Critique of Kantian Idealism
Authors: J.T.W. Ryall
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-56771-6
Publisher: Palgrave Macmillan Cham
eBook Packages: Religion and Philosophy, Philosophy and Religion (R0)
Copyright Information: The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017
Hardcover ISBN: 978-3-319-56770-9Published: 02 October 2017
Softcover ISBN: 978-3-319-85997-2Published: 10 August 2018
eBook ISBN: 978-3-319-56771-6Published: 18 September 2017
Edition Number: 1
Number of Pages: XII, 270
Topics: Epistemology, German Idealism, Philosophy of Mind, Ontology