Popper and His Popular Critics

Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos

  • Joseph Agassi

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Philosophy book series (BRIEFSPHILOSOPH)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xx
  2. Prelims

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 3-5
    3. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 7-11
    4. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 13-15
    5. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 17-23
  3. Popper and His Popular Critics

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 35-35
    2. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 37-52
    3. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 53-66
    4. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 67-76
    5. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 77-80
    6. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 81-88
  4. In a Nutshell

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 89-89
    2. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 91-98
    3. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 99-108
    4. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 109-119
    5. Joseph Agassi
      Pages 129-131

About this book


This volume examines Popper’s philosophy by analyzing the criticism of his most popular critics: Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend and Imre Lakatos. They all followed his rejection of the traditional view of science as inductive. Starting from the assumption that Hume’s criticism of induction is valid, the book explores the central criticism and objections that these three critics have raised. Their objections have met with great success, are significant and deserve paraphrase. One also may consider them reasonable protests against Popper’s high standards rather than fundamental criticisms of his philosophy. The book starts out with a preliminary discussion of some central background material and essentials of Popper’s philosophy. It ends with nutshell representations of the philosophies of Popper. Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos. The middle section of the book presents the connection between these philosophers and explains what their central ideas consists of, what the critical arguments are, how they presented them, and how valid they are. In the process, the author claims that Popper's popular critics used against him arguments that he had invented (and answered) without saying so. They differ from him mainly in that they demanded of all criticism that it should be constructive: do not stop believing a refuted theory unless there is a better alternative to it. Popper hardly ever discussed belief, delegating its study to psychology proper; he usually discussed only objective knowledge, knowledge that is public and thus open to public scrutiny.


Human Rules about God’s World Imre Lakatos Karl Raimund Popper Navigate between dogmatism and relativism Paul Feyerabend Paul Feyerabend and Rational Pluralism Popper and his Popular Critics Popper’s minimalist program Rational Pluralism Thomas Kuhn Wittgenstein-style philosophy

Authors and affiliations

  • Joseph Agassi
    • 1
  1. 1.Tel Aviv UniversityTel Aviv 69978Israel

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06587-8
  • Copyright Information The Author(s) 2014
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Humanities, Social Sciences and Law
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-06586-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-06587-8
  • Series Print ISSN 2211-4548
  • Series Online ISSN 2211-4556
  • About this book