The Paradox of Punishment

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xvii

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2. Prologue: The Paradox of Punishment

   • Thomas J. Miceli

   Pages 1-20

3. Competing Economic Theories of Crime

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 21-21

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   2. The Social Cost of Crime: Deterrence

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 23-45

   3. Crime As Exchange: Retribution

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 47-71

4. The Institutional Structure of Punishment

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 73-73

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   2. Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Balancing Deterrence and Retribution

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 75-95

   3. Plea Bargaining: Negotiated Justice

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 97-117

5. Other Objectives of Punishment

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 119-119

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   2. Repeat Offenders: Marginal Deterrence and Redemption

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 121-148

   3. Individual Versus Collective Responsibility: It Takes a Village

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 149-164

   4. The Limits of Punishment: Of Angels and Bad Men

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 165-197

6. Conclusion

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 199-199

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   2. Epilogue: What Have We Learned?

      • Thomas J. Miceli

      Pages 201-213

7. Back Matter

   Pages 215-234

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This book explores the insights that can be gained by looking at the criminal justice system from an economic point of view. It provides an economic analysis of the institutional structure and function of the criminal justice system, how its policies are formulated, and how they affect behavior. Yet it goes beyond an examination of specific policies to address the broad question of how law influences behavior. For example, it examines how concepts such as the possibility of redemption affect the decisions of repeat offenders, and whether individual responsibility is (or should be) a pre-requisite for punishment. Finally, the book argues that, in addition to the threat of criminal sanctions, law inculcates principles of acceptable behavior among citizens by asserting that certain acts are “against the law.” This “expressive function” of law can influence behavior to the extent that at least some people in society are receptive to such a message. For these people, the moral content of law has more than mere symbolic value, and consequently, it can expand the scope of traditional law enforcement while lowering its cost. Another goal of the book is therefore to use economic theory to assess this dualistic function of law by specifically recognizing how its policies can both internalize an ethic of obedience to the law among some people irrespective of its consequences, while simultaneously threatening to punish those who only respond to external incentives.

• law
• law and ecomics
• criminal justice
• criminal punishment
• Gary Becker
• economics of crime
• criminal justice system
• expressive function of law
• behavioral economics

• Department of Economics, University of Connecticut, Storrs Mansfield, USA

  Thomas J. Miceli

Thomas J. Miceli is Professor of Economics at the University of Connecticut, USA. His research is largely in the area of law and economics, with particular emphasis on property and criminal law. He is a recognized authority on the economics of eminent domain, a subject on which he has authored or co-authored three books. He has also published undergraduate and graduate level textbooks on law and economics, and has co-authored a law school textbook. Currently, he serves as an associate editor for the International Review of Law and Economics.

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