Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Advances in Cryptology

Proceedings of CRYPTO '84

  • Conference proceedings
  • © 1985

Overview

Editors:
  1. George Robert Blakley

    1. Department of Mathematics, Texas A&M University, College Station, USA

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

  2. David Chaum

    1. Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    View editor publications

    You can also search for this editor in PubMed   Google Scholar

Part of the book series: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (LNCS, volume 196)

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this book

Log in via an institution
eBook USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Other ways to access

Licence this eBook for your library

Institutional subscriptions

Table of contents (40 papers)

  1. Randomness and Its Concomitants

    1. Security of Ramp Schemes

      • G. R. Blakley, Catherine Meadows
      Pages 242-268

    2. A Fast Pseudo Random Permutation Generator With Applications to Cryptology

      • Selim G. Akl, Henk Meijer
      Pages 269-275

    3. On the Cryptographic Applications of Random Functions (Extended Abstract)

      • Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali
      Pages 276-288

    4. An Efficient Probabilistic Public-Key Encryption Scheme Which Hides All Partial Information

      • Manuel Blum, Shafi Goldwasser
      Pages 289-299

  2. Analysis and Cryptanalysis

    1. RSA/Rabin least significant bits are \( \tfrac{1} {2} + \tfrac{1} {{poly \left( {\log N} \right)}} \) secure (Extended Abstract)

      • Benny Chor, Oded Goldreich
      Pages 303-313

    2. Information Theory without the Finiteness Assumption, I: Cryptosystems as Group-Theoretic Objects

      • G. R. Blakley
      Pages 314-338

    3. Cryptanalysis of Adfgvx Encipherment Systems

      • Alan G. Konheim
      Pages 339-341

    4. Breaking Iterated Knapsacks

      • Ernest F. Brickell
      Pages 342-358

    5. Dependence of output on input in DES: Small avalanche characteristics

      • Yvo Desmedt, Jean-Jacques Quisquater, Marc Davio
      Pages 359-376

    6. Des has no Per Round Linear Factors

      • J. A. Reeds, J. L. Manferdelli
      Pages 377-389

  4. Impromptu Talks

    1. A “Paradoxical” Solution to The Signature Problem

      • Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, Ronald L. Rivest
      Pages 467-467

    2. Sequence Complexity as a Test for Cryptographic Systems

      • A. K. Leung, S. E. Tavares
      Pages 468-474

    3. An Update on Quantum Cryptography

      • Charles H. Bennett, Gilles Brassard
      Pages 475-480
Back to top

Keywords

About this book

Recently, there has been a lot of interest in provably "good" pseudo-random number generators [lo, 4, 14, 31. These cryptographically secure generators are "good" in the sense that they pass all probabilistic polynomial time statistical tests. However, despite these nice properties, the secure generators known so far suffer from the han- cap of being inefiicient; the most efiicient of these take n2 steps (one modular multip- cation, n being the length of the seed) to generate one bit. Pseudc-random number g- erators that are currently used in practice output n bits per multiplication (n2 steps). An important open problem was to output even two bits on each multiplication in a cryptographically secure way. This problem was stated by Blum, Blum & Shub [3] in the context of their z2 mod N generator. They further ask: how many bits can be o- put per multiplication, maintaining cryptographic security? In this paper we state a simple condition, the XOR-Condition and show that any generator satisfying this condition can output logn bits on each multiplication. We show that the XOR-Condition is satisfied by the lop least significant bits of the z2-mod N generator. The security of the z2 mod N generator was based on Quadratic Residu- ity [3]. This generator is an example of a Trapdoor Generator [13], and its trapdoor properties have been used in protocol design. We strengthen the security of this gene- tor by proving it as hard as factoring.

Editors and Affiliations

  • Department of Mathematics, Texas A&M University, College Station, USA

    George Robert Blakley

  • Center for Mathematics and Computer Science (CWI), Amsterdam, The Netherlands

    David Chaum

Bibliographic Information

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Back to top

Search

Navigation