Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts

  • Suren┬áBasov

Part of the Studies in Economic Theory book series (ECON.THEORY, volume 30)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-ix
  2. Suren Basov
    Pages 1-13
  3. Suren Basov
    Pages 119-146
  4. Suren Basov
    Pages 147-167

About this book


This book investigates the ways in which social norms and bounded rationality shape different contracts in the real world. It brings into focus existing research into optimal contracts, draws important lessons from that research, and outlines prospects for future investigation.
Bounded rationality has acknowledged effects on the power of incentive provisions, such as deviations from sufficient statistic theorem, the power of optimal incentives, and the effects of optimal contracts in multicultural environments. The introduction of social norms to bounded rationality opens up new avenues of investigation into contracts and mechanism design.
This book makes an important contribution to the study of bounded rationality by pulling together many separate strands of research in the area of mechanism design, and providing detailed analysis of the impact of societal values on contracts.


Auction Theory Behavioral Economics Bounded Rationality Boundedly Rational Agent Contract Theory Decision Theory Economic Equilibrium Economic Theory Economic Uncertainty Game Theory Imperfect Information Incomplete Contracts Mechanism Design Opportunity Cost Optimal Contracts Optimal Decision Revelation Principle Revenue Equivalence Social Norms Utility Maximization

Authors and affiliations

  • Suren┬áBasov
    • 1
  1. 1.Deakin UniversityCenter for Economics and Financial EconoBurwoodAustralia

Bibliographic information

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