Collective Decision-Making: Social Choice and Political Economy

  • Norman Schofield

Part of the Recent Economic Thought Series book series (RETH, volume 50)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xxi
  2. Introduction: Research Programs in Preference and Belief Aggregation

  3. Social Choice

  4. Elections and Committees

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 111-111
    2. David Austen-Smith
      Pages 113-148
    3. Norman Schofield
      Pages 183-220
    4. David Austen-Smith
      Pages 221-236
  5. Coalition Governments

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 237-237
    2. Junichiro Wada, Norman Schofield
      Pages 239-250
    3. Francesc Carreras, Guillermo Owen
      Pages 251-263
    4. Bernard Grofman, Philip Straffin, Nicholas Noviello
      Pages 281-293
    5. Carol Mershon
      Pages 315-334
  6. Political Economy

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 335-335
    2. Jan Potters, Frans van Winden
      Pages 337-362
    3. Rebecca B. Morton
      Pages 363-384
    4. Krishna K. Ladha
      Pages 385-392
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 411-422

About this book


In the last decade the techniques of social choice theory, game theory and positive political theory have been combined in interesting ways so as to pro­ vide a common framework for analyzing the behavior of a developed political economy. Social choice theory itself grew out of the innovative attempts by Ken­ neth Arrow (1951) and Duncan Black (1948, 1958) to extend the range of economic theory in order to deal with collective decision-making over public goods. Later work, by William Baumol (1952), and James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock (1962), focussed on providing an "economic" interpretation of democratic institutions. In the same period Anthony Downs (1957) sought to model representative democracy and elections while William Riker (1962) made use of work in cooperative game theory (by John von Neumann and Oscar Morgenstern, 1944) to study coalition behavior. In my view, these "rational choice" analyses of collective decision-making have their antecedents in the arguments of Adam Smith (1759, 1776), James Madison (1787) and the Marquis de Condorcet (1785) about the "design" of political institutions. In the introductory chapter to this volume I briefly describe how some of the current normative and positive aspects of social choice date back to these earlier writers.


Policy economy monetary policy political economy politics social choice theory

Editors and affiliations

  • Norman Schofield
    • 1
  1. 1.Washington University in St. LouisUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1996
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-481-5800-3
  • Online ISBN 978-94-015-8767-9
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-199X
  • Buy this book on publisher's site