Scientific Knowledge

Causation, Explanation, and Corroboration

  • James H. Fetzer

Part of the Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science book series (BSPS, volume 69)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvi
  2. Causation

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 3-22
    3. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 23-45
    4. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 46-73
  3. Explanation

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 75-75
    2. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 104-136
    3. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 137-171
  4. Corroboration

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 173-173
    2. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 175-201
    3. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 202-230
    4. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 231-263
    5. James H. Fetzer
      Pages 264-296
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 297-327

About this book


With this defense of intensional realism as a philosophical foundation for understanding scientific procedures and grounding scientific knowledge, James Fetzer provides a systematic alternative to much of recent work on scientific theory. To Fetzer, the current state of understanding the 'laws' of nature, or the 'law-like' statements of scientific theories, appears to be one of philosophical defeat; and he is determined to overcome that defeat. Based upon his incisive advocacy of the single-case propensity interpretation of probability, Fetzer develops a coherent structure within which the central problems of the philosophy of science find their solutions. Whether the reader accepts the author's contentions may, in the end, depend upon ancient choices in the interpretation of experience and explanation, but there can be little doubt of Fetzer's spirited competence in arguing for setting ontology before epistemology, and within the analysis of language. To us, Fetzer's ambition is appealing, fusing, as he says, the substantive commitment of the Popperian with the conscientious sensitivity of the Hempelian to the technical precision required for justified explication. To Fetzer, science is the objective pursuit of fallible general knowledge. This innocent character­ ization, which we suppose most scientists would welcome, receives a most careful elaboration in this book; it will demand equally careful critical con­ sideration. Center for the Philosophy and ROBERT S. COHEN History of Science, MARX W. WARTOFSKY Boston University October 1981 v TABLE OF CONTENTS EDITORIAL PREFACE v FOREWORD xi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS xv PART I: CAUSATION 1.


Charles Sanders Peirce Karl R. Popper Theory of Signs history of science philosophy of science probability realism science semantics

Authors and affiliations

  • James H. Fetzer
    • 1
  1. 1.New College of the University of South FloridaUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1981
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-90-277-1336-0
  • Online ISBN 978-94-009-8558-2
  • Series Print ISSN 0068-0346
  • Buy this book on publisher's site