Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

  • Eugenia Froedge Toma
  • Mark Toma

Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 13)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XIV
  2. Central Bankers, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy: An Introduction

  3. Structure of Central Bank Financing and Bureaucratic Rents

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 9-9
    2. Milton Friedman
      Pages 11-35
    3. William F. Shughart II, Robert D. Tollison
      Pages 67-90
    4. Wm Stewart Mounts Jr., Clifford Sowell
      Pages 91-104
  4. The Organization of Central Bank Bureaus and the Problems of Control

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 105-105
    2. John F. Chant, Keith Acheson
      Pages 107-128
    3. Keith Acheson, John F. Chant
      Pages 129-150
    4. Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
      Pages 151-168
  5. Political Pressures, Bureaucratic Incentives, and Monetary Policy

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 183-183
    2. King Banaian, Leroy O. Laney, Thomas D. Willett
      Pages 199-217
  6. Conclusion

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 241-241
    2. Eugenia Froedge Toma, Mark Toma
      Pages 243-249
  7. Back Matter
    Pages 251-251

About this book


By now it has become obvious that Federal Reserve actions have an immense impact on the functioning of our economy. As a result, a great deal of research has been done on the Fed and on monetary policy. Much of this work is normative; it tells us what the Fed should do. Positive work on the Fed has usually tried to elucidate particular Fed policies, and has not tried to present a theory of why the Fed behaves the way it does. The dominant theory of Fed behavior is that the Fed does what it believes to be best for the public welfare. This theory - usually left implicit - is so simple, and seemingly so obviously correct, that it has received widespread credence without extended discussion or tests. When thinking about govern­ ment in general many observers doubt that it nearly always acts in the public interest. However, they ascribe this unfortunate state of affairs mainly to political pressures. Since the Fed is relatively removed from such pressures, the public interest theory of government seems more applicable to it.


Financing Inflation banking economy human capital monetary policy organization organizations research science and technology welfare

Editors and affiliations

  • Eugenia Froedge Toma
    • 1
  • Mark Toma
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsAuburn UniversityUSA
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsMiami UniversityUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 1986
  • Publisher Name Springer, Dordrecht
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-94-010-8473-4
  • Online ISBN 978-94-009-4432-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
Industry Sectors
Finance, Business & Banking