The Welfare State, Public Investment, and Growth

Selected Papers from the 53rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance

  • Hirofumi Shibata
  • Toshihiro Ihori
Conference proceedings

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages II-XIII
  2. The Welfare State

  3. Public Investment and Economic Growth

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 39-39
    2. Vito Tanzi, Hamid Davoodi
      Pages 41-60
    3. Jan-Egbert Sturm, Jakob De Haan, Gerard H. Kuper
      Pages 61-83
  4. Inter-Governmental Relations

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 113-113
  5. Tax Competition and Foreign Direct Investment

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 167-167
    2. Shinemay Chen, Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Sally Wallace
      Pages 169-197
  6. Foreign Investment in Transitional Economies

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 219-219
    2. Vladimir I. Tikhomirov
      Pages 221-254
  7. Intergovernmental Transfer Systems

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 267-267
    2. Nobuki Mochida
      Pages 269-293
    3. Robert J. Searle
      Pages 295-324
  8. Back Matter
    Pages 325-334

About these proceedings


This book presents fifteen papers selected from the papers read at the 53rd Congress of the International Institute of Public Finance held at Kyoto, Japan, in August 1997. Although organized under the general title of Public Finance and Public Investment, the Congress covered a wide range of topics in Public Finance. One of the highlights of the Congress was a historic and brilliant debate between two of the greatest living authorities in the area of public finance, Professors James M. Buchanan and Richard A. Musgrave, on the nature of the welfare state and its future. Part I of this book is concerned with this debate and its empirical counterpart. James M. Buchanan (Chapter 1) warns that the welfare state will be unsustainable unless it preserves generality or at least quasi generality in welfare programs. The introduction of overt discrimination in welfare programs through means testing and targeting can only diminish public support. He argues that a political version of the "tragedy of commons" will emerge if and when identifiable interest groups recognize the prospects of particularized gains as promised by discriminatory tax or transfer payments. Faced with mounting pressure from entitlement-like claims of special interest groups against public revenues on one hand and equally strong pressure against further tax burdens on the other, political leaders are attracted to solutions that single out the most vulnerable targets. Distributional disagreement among classes will then become a major source of political discourse and an impetus for class conflict.


Finance Investment fiscal policy public finance tax competition

Editors and affiliations

  • Hirofumi Shibata
    • 1
  • Toshihiro Ihori
    • 2
  1. 1.College of Policy ScienceRitsumeikan UniversityKita-ku, Kyoto 603Japan
  2. 2.Department of EconomicsThe University of TokyoBunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113Japan

Bibliographic information

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