Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision

  • Eva I.¬†Hoppe-Fischer

Part of the Edition KWV book series (EKWV)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xi
  2. Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
    Pages 1-7
  3. Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Theoretical Studies

  4. Contract Design and Incentive Provision: Experimental Evidence

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 91-91
    2. Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
      Pages 185-195
  5. Back Matter
    Pages 196-211

About this book


Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I.


contract design incentive provisions public-private partnerships behavioral biases public ownership private ownership

Authors and affiliations

  • Eva I.¬†Hoppe-Fischer
    • 1
  1. 1.WiesbadenGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2011
  • Publisher Name Springer Gabler, Wiesbaden
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-658-24132-2
  • Online ISBN 978-3-658-24133-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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