Advertisement

Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept

  • Eric van Damme

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 219)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages N2-VI
  2. Eric van Damme
    Pages 1-22
  3. Eric van Damme
    Pages 23-48
  4. Eric van Damme
    Pages 49-67
  5. Eric van Damme
    Pages 69-88
  6. Eric van Damme
    Pages 89-112
  7. Eric van Damme
    Pages 113-142
  8. Back Matter
    Pages 143-155

About this book

Introduction

In this monograph, noncooperative games are studied. Since in a noncooperative game binding agreements are not possible, the solution of such a game has to be self­ enforcing, i. e. a Nash equilibrium (NASH [1950,1951J). In general, however, a game may possess many equilibria and so the problem arises which one of these should be chosen as the solution. It was first pointed out explicitly in SELTEN [1965J that I not all Nash equilibria of an extensive form game are qualified to be selected as the solution, since an equilibrium may prescribe irrational behavior at unreached parts of the game tree. Moreover, also for normal form games not all Nash equilibria are eligible, since an equilibrium need not be robust with respect to slight perturba­ tions in the data of the game. These observations lead to the conclusion that the Nash equilibrium concept has to be refined in order to obtain sensible solutions for every game. In the monograph, various refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept are studied. Some of these have been proposed in the literature, but others are presented here for the first time. The objective is to study the relations between these refine­ ments;to derive characterizations and to discuss the underlying assumptions. The greater part of the monograph (the chapters 2-5) is devoted to the study of normal form games. Extensive form games are considered in chapter 6.

Keywords

Nash-Gleichgewicht Nichtkooperatives Spiel dynamic programming equilibrium game theory incomplete information

Authors and affiliations

  • Eric van Damme
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Mathematics and Computing ScienceUniversity of TechnologyDelftThe Netherlands

Bibliographic information

  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-49970-8
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1983
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-12690-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-49970-8
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
Industry Sectors
Finance, Business & Banking