Network Economics and the Allocation of Savings

A Model of Peering in the Voice-over-IP Telecommunications Market

  • Philipp Servatius

Part of the Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems book series (LNE, volume 653)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xv
  2. Selected Theoretical Concepts

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 7-7
    2. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 1-6
    3. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 9-118
    4. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 119-155
  3. Applications to Peering in Telecommunications

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 157-157
    2. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 159-177
    3. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 179-234
    4. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 235-267
    5. Philipp Servatius
      Pages 273-285
  4. Back Matter
    Pages 287-297

About this book


This book provides a game theoretic model of interaction among VoIP telecommunications providers regarding their willingness to enter peering agreements with one another. The author shows that the incentive to peer is generally based on savings from otherwise payable long distance fees. At the same time, termination fees can have a countering and dominant effect, resulting in an environment in which VoIP firms decide against peering. Various scenarios of peering and rules for allocation of the savings are considered. The first part covers the relevant aspects of game theory and network theory, trying to give an overview of the concepts required in the subsequent application. The second part of the book introduces first a model of how the savings from peering can be calculated and then turns to the actual formation of peering relationships between VoIP firms. The conditions under which firms are willing to peer are then described, considering the possible influence of a regulatory body.


Game Theory Interconnection Network Theory Peering VoIP - Voice over Internet Protocol

Authors and affiliations

  • Philipp Servatius
    • 1
  1. 1., Department Quantitative EconomicsUniversité de FribourgFribourgSwitzerland

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-21095-2
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-21096-9
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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Finance, Business & Banking