© 2010

Strategic Social Choice

Stable Representations of Constitutions


Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xvii
  2. Representations of constitutions

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 3-6
    3. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 7-20
    4. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 21-43
    5. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 45-57
    6. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 59-66
    7. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 67-79
    8. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 81-94
  3. Consistent voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 95-95
    2. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 97-103
    3. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 105-112
    4. Bezalel Peleg, Hans Peters
      Pages 123-145
  4. Back Matter
    Pages 147-154

About this book


This monograph studies representations of effectivity functions by game forms that are at least Nash consistent, which means that they have a Nash equilibrium for any profile of preferences. In the second part the focus is on social choice functions that admit a strong Nash equilibrium resulting in the sincere outcome. A central interpretation of an effectivity function is that it models a constitution.


Constitutions Effectivity functions Game forms Nash and strong Nash equilibrium Strategic stability modeling

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.Center for the Study of Rationality, Interactive Decision TheoryHebrew University of JerusalemJerusalemIsrael
  2. 2.Dept. Quantitative EconomicsMaastricht UniversityMaastrichtNetherlands

Bibliographic information

Industry Sectors
Finance, Business & Banking


From the reviews:

“The book studies stable representations of constitutions. … the book is very well written and perfectly organized … . I can highly recommend the book by Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters: a real pleasure for scholars working on effectivity functions and social choice functions, and a great learning opportunity for those who are not that familiar with the topics in question. It is an excellent contribution, bringing together a lot of material in a single manuscript in a coherent way.” (Agnieszka Rusinowska, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 40, 2013)

“The book presents in terms of effectivity functions (i.e. coalitional game forms) a very deep, clear and consistent exposition of the most important social choice problem­–coalitional decision making. … Written by two authors who have made outstanding contributions to the developed theory, the book will be very useful for game and social choice experts, lecturers, and master’s and Ph.D. students in these fields.” (Fouad T. Aleskerov, Mathematical Reviews, Issue 2012 b)