Handbook on Approval Voting

  • Jean-François Laslier
  • M. Remzi Sanver

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xviii
  2. Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
    Pages 1-12
  3. History of Approval Voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 14-14
    2. Steven J. Brams, Peter C. Fishburn
      Pages 19-37
  4. Axiomatic Theory

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 40-40
    2. Biung-Ghi Ju
      Pages 41-90
    3. Yongsheng Xu
      Pages 91-102
  5. Committees

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 104-104
    2. D. Marc Kilgour
      Pages 105-124
  6. Strategic Voting

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 152-152
    2. Jean-François Laslier, M. Remzi Sanver
      Pages 153-163
    3. Matías Núñez
      Pages 165-197
    4. Dorothea Baumeister, Gábor Erdélyi, Edith Hemaspaandra, Lane A. Hemaspaandra, Jörg Rothe
      Pages 199-251
  7. Probabilistic Exercises

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 254-254
    2. Mostapha Diss, Vincent Merlin, Fabrice Valognes
      Pages 255-283
    3. Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 311-335
  8. Experiments

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 338-338
    2. Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 339-356
    3. Carlos Alós–Ferrer, Ðura-Georg Granić
      Pages 397-411
  9. Electoral Competition

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 414-414
    2. Jean-François Laslier, François Maniquet
      Pages 415-429
  10. Meaning for Individual and Society

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 454-454
    2. Jean-François Laslier
      Pages 455-468
    3. M. Remzi Sanver
      Pages 469-481

About this book


Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.


Approval Voting Democracy Elections Electoral Voting Behavior election game theory voter voting

Editors and affiliations

  • Jean-François Laslier
    • 1
  • M. Remzi Sanver
    • 2
  1. 1.Labo. d'EconometrieÉcole PolytechniquePalaiseau CXFrance
  2. 2.Dept. EconomicsIstanbul Bilgi UniversityIstanbulTurkey

Bibliographic information

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