Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages 1-16
  2. Christian Korth
    Pages 7-17
  3. Christian Korth
    Pages 19-34
  4. Christian Korth
    Pages 57-80
  5. Christian Korth
    Pages 139-167
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 1-6

About this book


This book contributes to behavioral economic research on the central issue of social preferences, focusing on the implications of social fairness norms on the interaction of market participants. The author uses both game-theoretic and experimental methods to analyze the implications of social fairness norms on the outcomes of bilateral bargaining situations. It is shown that a preference for reciprocity is evolutionarily stable in a "game of life" that consists of bilateral bargaining situations. The fairness benchmark or reference that such a preference depends on is investigated through a classroom experiment. Furthermore, the book presents a theoretical analysis of a market model as well as an experimental laboratory study to explore the implications of fairness concerns for price formation in matching markets.


Behavioral Economics Evolutionary Stability Random Matching Reciprocity Reference Dependence Social Preferences calculus game theory

Authors and affiliations

  • Christian Korth
    • 1
  1. 1.Fak. Rechts- und, WirtschaftswissenschaftenUniversität BayreuthBayreuthGermany

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2009
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Business and Economics
  • Print ISBN 978-3-642-02252-4
  • Online ISBN 978-3-642-02253-1
  • Series Print ISSN 0075-8442
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
Industry Sectors
Finance, Business & Banking