Operational Semantics and Verification of Security Protocols

  • Cas Cremers
  • Sjouke Mauw

Part of the Information Security and Cryptography book series (ISC)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XIII
  2. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 1-7
  3. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 9-11
  4. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 13-35
  5. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 37-65
  6. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 67-105
  7. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 107-122
  8. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 123-141
  9. Cas Cremers, Sjouke Mauw
    Pages 143-155
  10. Back Matter
    Pages 157-172

About this book


Security protocols are widely used to ensure secure communications over insecure networks, such as the internet or airwaves. These protocols use strong cryptography to prevent intruders from reading or modifying the messages. However, using cryptography is not enough to ensure their correctness. Combined with their typical small size, which suggests that one could easily assess their correctness, this often results in incorrectly designed protocols.

The authors present a methodology for formally describing security protocols and their environment. This methodology includes a model for describing protocols, their execution model, and the intruder model. The models are extended with a number of well-defined security properties, which capture the notions of correct protocols, and secrecy of data. The methodology can be used to prove that protocols satisfy these properties. Based on the model they have developed a tool set called Scyther that can automatically find attacks on security protocols or prove their correctness. In case studies they show the application of the methodology as well as the effectiveness of the analysis tool.

The methodology’s strong mathematical basis, the strong separation of concerns in the model, and the accompanying tool set make it ideally suited both for researchers and graduate students of information security or formal methods and for advanced professionals designing critical security protocols.


Correctness Formal methods Information security Intruder model Scyther Secrecy Security protocols Semantics Verification

Authors and affiliations

  • Cas Cremers
    • 1
  • Sjouke Mauw
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Computer ScienceETH ZürichZürichSwitzerland
  2. 2.Faculté des Sciences, de la TechnologieUniversité du LuxembourgLuxembourgLuxembourg

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Computer Science
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-78635-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-78636-8
  • Series Print ISSN 1619-7100
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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