The Evolution of Standards

  • Authors
  • Volker Simmering

Part of the Ökonomische Analyse des Rechts book series (ÖAR)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-XIII
  2. Volker Simmering
    Pages 1-6
  3. Volker Simmering
    Pages 65-87
  4. Volker Simmering
    Pages 166-181
  5. Volker Simmering
    Pages 182-184
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 185-193

About this book


The value of many goods and many social and legal norms and institutions is correlated to the number of people who adopt them, in other words: They exhibit network effects. But while harmonization enhances network benefits, it also diminishes the benefits derived from variety.

In the first part of his study, Volker Simmering introduces an evolutionary game theoretic model in order to investigate how globalization influences the evolution of international standards and he compares the roles of mandatory and voluntary standards. The second part is devoted to the problem of technological progress in networks, and the third one analyzes the resolution of conflicts within international standardization bodies. As a result, he suggests that policy intervention and the presence of adjacent institutional arrangements are likely to improve the performance of network markets, e.g. those for information technology and telecommunication. Since standardization is difficult to enforce its design is, however, not a trivial challenge.


Evolutorische Spieltheorie Netzwerkeffekte Standardisierung Standardisierungskomitee Technischer Fortschritt Wechselkosten economics globalization ökonomische Analyse des Rechts

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Gabler Verlag | Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, Wiesbaden 2003
  • Publisher Name Deutscher Universitätsverlag
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-8244-7832-3
  • Online ISBN 978-3-322-81514-9
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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