Presidents versus Federalism in the National Legislative Process

The Argentine Senate in Comparative Perspective

  • Hirokazu┬áKikuchi

Part of the IDE-JETRO Series book series (IDE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xx
  2. Hirokazu Kikuchi
    Pages 1-17
  3. Hirokazu Kikuchi
    Pages 145-190
  4. Hirokazu Kikuchi
    Pages 191-247
  5. Hirokazu Kikuchi
    Pages 249-277
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 279-295

About this book


This book rethinks gubernatorial effects on national politics using the case of the Argentine Senate. Simultaneously analyzing senatorial behavior in committees and on the floor, Kikuchi argues that senators strategically change their actions according to stages in the legislative process, and that longstanding governors may influence national politics, causing their senators to shelve unwanted presidential bills at the committee stage. He explains senatorial behavior focusing on varieties in the combinations of principals, whose preferences senators must take into account, and shows that legislators under the same electoral system do not necessarily behave in the same way. He also demonstrates that this argument can be applied to cases from other federal countries, such as Brazil and Mexico. Based on rich qualitative evidence and quantitative data, the book offers a theoretical framework for understanding how some governors may influence national politics.


National politics Federalism Political decentralization Regional governors Legislator behaviour Tenure power Gubernatorial effects Argentine Senate Legislative politics

Authors and affiliations

  • Hirokazu┬áKikuchi
    • 1
  1. 1.Institute of Developing EconomiesJapan External Trade OrganizationChibaJapan

Bibliographic information