Partition Function Form Games

Coalitional Games with Externalities

  • László Á. Kóczy

Part of the Theory and Decision Library C book series (TDLC, volume 48)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xxi
  2. Foundations

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 1-1
    2. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 3-6
    3. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 7-18
    4. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 19-59
  3. Stability

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 61-61
    2. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 63-69
    3. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 71-105
    4. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 107-141
    5. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 143-150
  4. Fairness

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 151-151
    2. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 153-171
    3. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 173-200
    4. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 201-221
  5. Applications

    1. Front Matter
      Pages 223-223
    2. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 225-237
    3. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 239-268
    4. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 269-279
    5. László Á. Kóczy
      Pages 281-287
  6. Back Matter
    Pages 289-312

About this book


This book presents a systematic overview on partition function form games: a game form in cooperative game theory to integrate externalities for various applications. Cooperative game theory has been immensely useful to study a wide range of issues, but the standard approaches ignore the side effects of cooperation. Recently interest shifted to problems where externalities play the main roles such as models of cooperation in market competition or the shared use of public resources. Such problems require richer models that can explicitly evaluate the side-effects of cooperation. In partition function form games the value of cooperation depends on the outsiders' actions. A recent surge of interest driven by applications has made results very fragmented. This book offers an accessible, yet comprehensive and systematic study of properties, solutions and applications of partition function games surveying both theoretical results and their applications. It assembles a survey of existing research and smaller original results as well as original interpretations and comparisons. The book is self-contained and accessible for readers with little or no knowledge of cooperative game theory.


Game theory Cooperative game theory Cooperative games with externalities Coalition formation Partition function form Behavioral expectations Core Shapley value Stable payoff configurations Public good games Oligopoly mergers International environmental agreements Stability of agreements

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.Institute of Economics, Centre for Economics and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences and Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, Óbuda UniversityBudapestHungary

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer International Publishing AG, part of Springer Nature 2018
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-69840-3
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-69841-0
  • Series Print ISSN 0924-6126
  • Series Online ISSN 2194-3044
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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