Fair Queueing

  • Youngsub Chun

Part of the Studies in Choice and Welfare book series (WELFARE)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xi
  2. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 1-6
  3. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 7-14
  4. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 15-28
  5. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 47-59
  6. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 61-78
  7. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 93-113
  8. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 115-139
  9. Youngsub Chun
    Pages 141-157

About this book


This monograph provides a detailed analysis on fair queueing rules from a normative, a strategic, and a non-cooperative viewpoint. The queueing problem is concerned with the following situation: There is a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting costs. The problem is to find the order in which to serve agents and monetary transfers they should receive. The queueing problem has been studied extensively in the recent literature.


Queuing Queueing problem Game Theory Cooperative game theory Axiomatic characterizations Strategyproofness Non-cooperative justification

Authors and affiliations

  • Youngsub Chun
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of EconomicsSeoul National UniversitySeoulKorea (Republic of)

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2016
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-319-33770-8
  • Online ISBN 978-3-319-33771-5
  • Series Print ISSN 1614-0311
  • Series Online ISSN 2197-8530
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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