© 2020

The Internal Senses in the Aristotelian Tradition

  • Seyed N. Mousavian
  • Jakob Leth Fink

Part of the Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind book series (SHPM, volume 22)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-v
  2. Seyed N. Mousavian, Jakob Leth Fink
    Pages 1-14
  3. Central Questions in Their Historical Contexts

  4. Case Studies: From Historical and Contemporary Perspectives

  5. Back Matter
    Pages 167-171

About this book


This volume is a collection of essays on a special theme in Aristotelian philosophy of mind: the internal senses. The first part of the volume is devoted to the central question of whether or not any internal senses exist in Aristotle’s philosophy of mind and, if so, how many and how they are individuated. The provocative claim of chapter one is that Aristotle recognizes no such internal sense. His medieval Latin interpreters, on the other hand, very much thought that Aristotle did introduce a number of internal senses as shown in the second chapter.

The second part of the volume contains a number of case studies demonstrating the philosophical background of some of the most influential topics covered by the internal senses in the Aristotelian tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind. The focus of the case studies is on memory, imagination and estimation. Chapters introduce the underlying mechanisms of memory and recollection taking its cue from Aristotle but reaching into early modern philosophy as well as studying composite imagination in Avicenna’s philosophy of mind. Further topics include the Latin reception of Avicenna’s estimative faculty and the development of the internal senses as well as offering an account of the logic of objects of imagination.


Francisco Suárez Internal Senses Jodocus Trutfetter Logic of Imagination The Aristotelian Tradition The Estimative Faculty Internal Senses and Aristotle’s Cognitive Theory Medieval Views of Faculty Psychology Aristotle, Confusion, and the Historicity of Memory Estimative Power as a Social Sense Avicenna’s Doctrine of Knowledge Jodocus Trutfetter on Internal Senses Imagination, Non-Existence, Impossibility Aristotelian tradition and contemporary philosophy of mind memory, imagination and estimation mechanisms of memory and recollection composite imagination in Avicenna’s philosophy of mind development of internal senses

Editors and affiliations

  • Seyed N. Mousavian
    • 1
  • Jakob Leth Fink
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of ScienceUniversity of GothenburgGothenburgSweden
  2. 2.SAXO-InstituttetKøbenhavnDenmark

About the editors

Jakob Leth Fink (PhD Copenhagen 2009) is a postdoctoral researcher in Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition at Gothenburg University. His research interests cover Aristotle, the Aristotelian Tradition, ethics and dialectic. He has recently published on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and its medieval reception. 

Seyed N. Mousavian (PhD Alberta, 2008) is a research fellow in Representation and Reality at the Department of Philosophy, Linguistics, and Theory of Science, University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg, Sweden and an associate professor of philosophy at the School of Analytic Philosophy, Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences (IPM), Tehran, Iran. His research interests include philosophy of language, metaphysics and Medieval Arabic philosophy. He has published in Mind and LanguageOxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Pacific Philosophical QuarterlyCanadian Journal of Philosophy, and Synthese among other places.

Bibliographic information