Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain

An Examination of the (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Five Main Paradoxes

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Hannu Nurmi

Part of the SpringerBriefs in Economics book series (BRIEFSECONOMICS)

Table of contents

About this book


This book deals with 20 voting procedures used or proposed for use in elections resulting in the choice of a single winner. These procedures are evaluated in terms of their ability to avoid five important paradoxes in a restricted domain, viz., when a Condorcet winner exists and is elected in the initial profile. Together with the two companion volumes by the same authors, published by Springer in 2017 and 2018, this book aims at giving a comprehensive overview of the most important advantages and disadvantages of voting procedures thereby assisting decision makers in the choice of a voting procedure that would best suit their purposes.


Voting Voting procedure Voting paradox Elections Vulnerability to voting paradox Non-ranked voting procedures Ranked voting procedures Condorcet-consistent voting procedures

Authors and affiliations

  • Dan S. Felsenthal
  • Hannu Nurmi
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of Political ScienceUniversity of TurkuTurkuFinland

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019
  • Publisher Name Springer, Cham
  • eBook Packages Economics and Finance
  • Print ISBN 978-3-030-12626-1
  • Online ISBN 978-3-030-12627-8
  • Series Print ISSN 2191-5504
  • Series Online ISSN 2191-5512
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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