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© 1991

Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications

  • Michael A. Einhorn
Book

Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 6)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages i-xi
  2. Michael A. Einhorn
    Pages 1-14
  3. Timothy J. Brennan
    Pages 33-45
  4. Peter B. Linhart, Roy Radner, Frank W. Sinden
    Pages 127-153
  5. Luis M. B. Cabral, Michael H. Riordan
    Pages 155-165
  6. David S. Sibley, Daniel P. Heyman, William E. Taylor
    Pages 191-206
  7. Michael A. Einhorn
    Pages 207-220
  8. Calvin S. Monson, Alexander C. Larson
    Pages 221-237
  9. Back Matter
    Pages 239-244

About this book

Introduction

Michael A. Einhorn In continuing to deregulate telecommunications companies, regulators have begun to consider alternative approaches to traditional cost-based price regulation as a means of encouraging monopoly efficiency, promulgating technological innova­ tion, protecting consumers, and reducing administrative costs. Under cost-based regulatory procedures that had been used, prices were designed to recover the regulated company's costs plus an allowed rate of return on its rate base; this strategy was costly to administer, provided no consistent incentives to cost-ef­ ficiency and technological improvement, afforded many opportunities for strategic misrepresentation of reported costs, and may have encouraged both uneconomic expansion of the utility's rate base and cross-subsidization of its competitive services. A category of alternative regulatory approaches can be classified broadly as social contracts. Under the general strategy of social contract regulation, regulators first delimit a group of regulated core services that they continue to regulate and then stipulate a list of constraints that the utility must agree to meet in the future; in exchange, regulators agree to detariff or deregulate entirely other competitive or nonessential services that the utility may offer. As long as no stipulated constraints are violated, the utility may price freely any service; if it reduces costs, it may keep a share of its profits. According to the National Telecommunications Information Administration (NTIA, 1987), social contract agreements of one form or another have been considered or implemented in a majority of American states.

Keywords

efficiency innovation regulation research

Editors and affiliations

  • Michael A. Einhorn
    • 1
  1. 1.Rutgers UniversityNewarkUSA

Bibliographic information

  • Book Title Price Caps and Incentive Regulation in Telecommunications
  • Editors Michael A. Einhorn
  • Series Title Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series
  • DOI https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3976-6
  • Copyright Information Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991
  • Publisher Name Springer, Boston, MA
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Hardcover ISBN 978-0-7923-9113-5
  • Softcover ISBN 978-1-4613-6776-5
  • eBook ISBN 978-1-4615-3976-6
  • Edition Number 1
  • Number of Pages XI, 244
  • Number of Illustrations 0 b/w illustrations, 0 illustrations in colour
  • Topics Industrial Organization
    Economic Policy
    Operations Research/Decision Theory
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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Reviews

'This book is a fine source of materials on price-caps and incentive regulation. It is highly topical and should appeal to anyone, especially economists, interested in the telecommunications industry. In addittion, it would make an excellent supplement text to any graduate-level course on regiulation.' Int. J. General Systems 20 1992