© 2009

Freedom and Value

Freedom’s Influence on Welfare and Worldly Value


Part of the Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy book series (LOET, volume 21)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-X
  2. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 1-9
  3. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 11-19
  4. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 41-59
  5. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 61-76
  6. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 91-109
  7. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 111-117
  8. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 135-147
  9. Ishtiyaque Haji
    Pages 149-168
  10. Back Matter
    Pages 185-204

About this book


Freedom of the sort implicated in acting freely or with free will is important to the truth of different sorts of moral judgment, such as judgments of moral responsibility and those of moral obligation. Little thought, however, has been invested into whether appraisals of good or evil presuppose free will. This important topic has not commanded the attention it deserves owing to what is perhaps a prevalent assumption that freedom leaves judgments concerning good and evil largely unaffected. The central aim of this book is to dispute this assumption by arguing for the relevance of free will to the truth of two sorts of such judgment: welfare-ranking judgments or judgments of personal well-being (when is one's life intrinsically good for the one who lives it?), and world-ranking judgments (when is a possible world intrinsically better than another?). The book also examines free will’s impact on the truth of such judgments for central issues in moral obligation and in the free will debate. This book should be of interest to those working on intrinsic value, personal well-being, moral obligation, and free will.


Hedonism liberty morality truth

Authors and affiliations

  1. 1.Dept. PhilosophyUniversity of CalgaryCalgaryCanada

Bibliographic information

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