Advances in Cryptology — CRYPTO ’87


  • Carl Pomerance
Conference proceedings CRYPTO 1987

Part of the Lecture Notes in Computer Science book series (LNCS, volume 293)

Table of contents

  1. Front Matter
    Pages I-X
  2. Communication Networks and Standards

  3. Protocols

    1. Yvo Desmedt, Claude Goutier, Samy Bengio
      Pages 21-39
    2. Russell Impagliazzo, Moti Yung
      Pages 40-51
    3. Alfredo De Santis, Silvio Micali, Giuseppe Persiano
      Pages 52-72
    4. David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 87-119
    5. Jeroen van de Graaf, Renė Peralta
      Pages 128-134
    6. Ernest F. Brickell, David Chaum, Ivan B. Damgård, Jeroen van de Graaf
      Pages 156-166
    7. Judy H. Moore
      Pages 167-172
  4. Key Distribution Systems

  5. Public Key Systems

    1. Gustavus J. Simmons
      Pages 211-215
    2. George I. Davida, Brian J. Matt
      Pages 216-222
    3. Louis Guillou, Jean-Jacques Quisquater
      Pages 223-223
  6. Design and Analysis of Cryptographic Systems

  7. Applications

    1. Maurice P. Herlihy, J. D. Tygar
      Pages 379-391
    2. Michael Luby, Charles Rackoff
      Pages 392-397
    3. E. F. Brickell, P. J. Lee, Y. Yacobi
      Pages 418-426
  8. Informal Contributions

  9. Back Matter
    Pages 463-463

About these proceedings


Zero-knowledge interactive proofsystems are a new technique which can be used as a cryptographic tool for designing provably secure protocols. Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff originally suggested this technique for controlling the knowledge released in an interactive proof of membership in a language, and for classification of languages [19]. In this approach, knowledge is defined in terms of complexity to convey knowledge if it gives a computational advantage to the receiver, theory, and a message is said for example by giving him the result of an intractable computation. The formal model of interacting machines is described in [19, 15, 171. A proof-system (for a language L) is an interactive protocol by which one user, the prover, attempts to convince another user, the verifier, that a given input x is in L. We assume that the verifier is a probabilistic machine which is limited to expected polynomial-time computation, while the prover is an unlimited probabilistic machine. (In cryptographic applications the prover has some trapdoor information, or knows the cleartext of a publicly known ciphertext) A correct proof-system must have the following properties: If XE L, the prover will convince the verifier to accept the pmf with very high probability. If XP L no prover, no matter what program it follows, is able to convince the verifier to accept the proof, except with vanishingly small probability.


authentication cryptoanalysis cryptography cryptology cryptosystems data security digital signature encryption privacy security

Editors and affiliations

  • Carl Pomerance
    • 1
  1. 1.Department of MathematicsThe University of GeorgiaAthensUSA

Bibliographic information

  • DOI
  • Copyright Information Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1988
  • Publisher Name Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg
  • eBook Packages Springer Book Archive
  • Print ISBN 978-3-540-18796-7
  • Online ISBN 978-3-540-48184-3
  • Series Print ISSN 0302-9743
  • Series Online ISSN 1611-3349
  • Buy this book on publisher's site
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