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Memory & Cognition

, Volume 46, Issue 8, pp 1344–1359 | Cite as

Mental models and omissive causation

  • Sangeet Khemlani
  • Christina Wasylyshyn
  • Gordon Briggs
  • Paul Bello
Article

Abstract

Some causal relations refer to causation by commission (e.g., “A gunshot causes death”), and others refer to causation by omission (e.g., “Not breathing causes death”). We describe a theory of the representation of omissive causation based on the assumption that people mentally simulate sets of possibilities—mental models—that represent causes, enabling conditions, and preventions (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). The theory holds that omissive causes, enabling conditions, and preventions each refer to distinct sets of possibilities. For any such causal relation, reasoners typically simulate one initial possibility, but they are able to consider alternative possibilities through deliberation. These alternative possibilities allow them to deliberate over finer-grained distinctions when reasoning about causes and effects. Hence, reasoners should be able to distinguish between omissive causes and omissive enabling conditions. Four experiments corroborated the predictions of the theory. We describe them and contrast the results with the predictions of alternative accounts of causal representation and inference.

Keywords

Omissions Absences Causal reasoning Mental models Negative possibilities Double prevention 

Supplementary material

13421_2018_841_MOESM1_ESM.docx (13 kb)
ESM 1 (DOCX 12 kb)

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Copyright information

© This is a U.S. government work and its text is not subject to copyright protection in the United States; however, its text may be subject to foreign copyright protection  2018

Authors and Affiliations

  • Sangeet Khemlani
    • 1
  • Christina Wasylyshyn
    • 1
  • Gordon Briggs
    • 1
  • Paul Bello
    • 1
  1. 1.Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial IntelligenceNaval Research LaboratoryWashingtonUSA

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