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Controlling & Management

, Volume 52, Supplement 1, pp 12–18 | Cite as

Verhaltensorientiertes Controlling: Ergebnisse wirtschaftswissenschaftlicher Laborexperimente

  • Ulrike Stefani
THEORETISCHE GRUNDLAGEN
  • 1.3k Downloads

1 Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Laborexperimente

Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung

Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Experimente dienen der gezielten Gewinnung von Daten zur Untersuchung ökonomisch relevanter Situationen „am lebenden Objekt“. Mit Laborexperimenten werden häufig einfache, aber sehr reale wirtschaftliche Prozesse untersucht: „Real people motivated by real money make real decisions, real mistakes and suffer real frustrations and delights because of their real talents and real limitations“ (Plott 1991, S. 905). Die Wirtschaftswissenschaften galten lange als Disziplinen, die einer experimentellen Untersuchung nicht zugänglich sind. Heute bilden Laborexperimente jedoch einen integralen Bestandteil der wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Forschung, und spätestens seit der Verleihung des Nobelpreises 2002 an Vernon Smith „for having established laboratory experiments as a tool in empirical economic analysis“ werden die Ergebnisse experimenteller Studien zunehmend in der...

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© Gabler Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH 2008

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  • Ulrike Stefani

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