Biological Theory

, Volume 5, Issue 3, pp 223–227 | Cite as

Adaptation, Exaptation, By-Products, and Spandrels in Evolutionary Explanations of Morality

Article

Keywords

Moral Judgment Adaptationist Account Biological Theory Moral Rule Evolutionary Explanation 

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Copyright information

© Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhilosophyAustralian National UniversityActonAustralia

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