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Tax evasion as a contagion game: evidences from an agent-based model

  • Letizia S. Di MauroEmail author
  • Alessandro Pluchino
  • Alessio E. Biondo
Regular Article
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Abstract

This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple economic system where the personal satisfaction gained from public services and the perceived opinion of neighbors are shown to drive the individual decision about tax compliance. Results of simulations, consistent with existing literature on the topic, suggest a peculiar approach to face the plague of tax evasion.

Graphical abstract

Keywords

Statistical and Nonlinear Physics 

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Copyright information

© EDP Sciences / Società Italiana di Fisica / Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature 2019

Authors and Affiliations

  • Letizia S. Di Mauro
    • 1
    Email author
  • Alessandro Pluchino
    • 1
  • Alessio E. Biondo
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of Physics and AstronomyUniversity of Catania and INFN Sezione di CataniaCataniaItaly
  2. 2.Department of Economics and BusinessUniversity of CataniaCataniaItaly

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