Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences

, Volume 87, Issue 2, pp 199–204 | Cite as

The military–strategic and humanitarian significance of the defense of Leningrad

Discussion Forum
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Abstract

The authors of this article respond to V.A. Nekhamkin’s call to answer the counterfactual challenge of the past related to the question of surrendering Leningrad in the course of the Great Patriotic War. Refuting numerous pseudoscientific investigations of revisionists of the history of that war, the authors show the misanthropic essence of the Third Reich’s plans with respect to the Soviet Union in general and Leningrad in particular and, using the logic of alternative history, analyze, first, possible actions of the military–political leadership of Nazi Germany in a situation similar to the blockade of Leningrad and, second, possible military consequences of the loss of the city on the Neva River. From the point of view of military science and humanitarian considerations, it is proved that the actions of the Soviet command in defending Leningrad were not only right but also that no alternative existed.

Keywords

Great Patriotic War defense of Leningrad Operation Barbarossa Generalplan Ost 

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2017

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Moscow State UniversityMoscowRussia

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