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Awareness and Control Decentralization

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Abstract

The control problem of an organizational system under external uncertainty is considered. The reasonability of using decentralized control depending on the volume of available information about uncertain factors is investigated. The qualitative structure of optimal strategies with centralized and decentralized control is studied.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Dorodnicyn Computing Centre, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    M. A. Gorelov & F. I. Ereshko

Authors
  1. M. A. Gorelov
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  2. F. I. Ereshko
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Correspondence to M. A. Gorelov or F. I. Ereshko.

Additional information

Russian Text © The Author(s), 2019, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2019, No. 6, pp. 156–172.

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Gorelov, M.A., Ereshko, F.I. Awareness and Control Decentralization. Autom Remote Control 80, 1109–1122 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919060092

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117919060092

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