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Static Models of Coordination of Social and Private Interests in Resource Allocation

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

This paper analyzes conditions of system compatibility in the game-theoretic models of resource allocation between social and private activities. We describe economic and administrative control mechanisms for system compatibility.

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Correspondence to O. I. Gorbaneva.

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Original Russian Text © O.I. Gorbaneva, G.A. Ougolnitsky, 2016, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2016, No. 2, pp. 28–57.

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Gorbaneva, O.I., Ougolnitsky, G.A. Static Models of Coordination of Social and Private Interests in Resource Allocation. Autom Remote Control 79, 1319–1341 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918070111

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918070111

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