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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 79, Issue 5, pp 841–859 | Cite as

Modeling Reflexion in the Non-Linear Model of the Stakelberg Three-Agent Oligopoly for the Russian Telecommunication Market

  • M. I. Geras’kinEmail author
Control in Social Economic Systems

Abstract

We consider the problem of finding equilibria in games with three agents on an oligopolic market with a linear demand function and nonlinear agent cost functions. Under strategic reflexion of the agents regarding the presence of a Stackelberg leader (leaders) of the first and second levels, we obtain expressions for information equilibria. Modeling real agent costs and demand functions of the Russian telecommunication market has allowed us to construct a set of information equilibria which we have compared with parameters of the real market and showed the presence of reflexion of the first and second ranks.

Keywords

oligopoly Stackelberg leader reflexive game Nash equilibrium 

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2018

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Korolev Samara National Research UniversitySamaraRussia

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