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Analysis of game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market under constrains on the capacity and competitiveness of agents

  • Control in Social Economic Systems
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Abstract

We develop an oligopoly model for nonlinear cost functions of the agents under constraints on the competitiveness and capacity of the agents and formulate Nash equilibrium conditions for this model. We develop a game-theoretic model for choosing the strategies for competitive and unbounded in capacity agents and define a Pareto optimal solution for this model under complete information.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Korolev Samara National Research University, Samara, Russia

    M. I. Geras’kin

  2. Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

    A. G. Chkhartishvili

Authors
  1. M. I. Geras’kin
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  2. A. G. Chkhartishvili
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Correspondence to M. I. Geras’kin.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © M.I. Geras’kin, A.G. Chkhartishvili, 2017, published in Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2017, No. 11, pp. 105–121.

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Geras’kin, M.I., Chkhartishvili, A.G. Analysis of game-theoretic models of an oligopoly market under constrains on the capacity and competitiveness of agents. Autom Remote Control 78, 2025–2038 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511791711008X

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S000511791711008X

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