Abstract
This paper considers a new model of multistage games with perfect information in which players can control decision-making time. At each stage of the game, players choose a certain alternative from a finite set of basic alternatives and also time necessary to realize this basic alternative. The payoffs of players depend on the game path defined by the chosen alternatives and also on the time to realize this path at each stage. We use the subgame-perfect ε-Nash equilibrium as the optimality principle of the model. This paper is a continuation of the earlier research [5].
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Original Russian Text © O.L. Petrosian, 2015, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2015, No. 2, pp. 49–68.
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Petrosian, O.L. On a game with perfect information and time-claiming alternatives. Autom Remote Control 78, 1693–1708 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917090132
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117917090132