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Threshold models of mutual insurance

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Abstract

Game-theoretic models of mutual insurance are considered. Here a player chooses between participating in a mutual insurance fund or not. Player’s behavior depends on its risk aversion. Using a scalar coefficient of agent’s risk aversion degree, we define utility functions leading to the threshold behavior of agents. Next, the game-theoretic models of anonymous and non-anonymous insurants are studied and Nash equilibrium conditions are established for both models.

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Correspondence to V. V. Breer.

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Original Russian Text © V.V. Breer, D.A. Novikov, 2011, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Priloszheniya, 2011, No. 4, pp. 3–22.

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Breer, V.V., Novikov, D.A. Threshold models of mutual insurance. Autom Remote Control 76, 897–908 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915050148

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