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The bargaining solution among threshold strategies

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

We consider a bargaining problem which engages a seller (player I) and a buyer (player II). Each player possesses private information about own reservation price which is unavailable to the opponent. Players appear on the market and announce their prices for a product. If the transaction takes place then the gain of a player is the difference between the negotiated and the reservation prices. We find the equilibrium in this game among threshold strategies.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Center, Russian Academy of Sciences, Petrozavodsk, Russia

    V. V. Mazalov & A. Y. Kondratev

Authors
  1. V. V. Mazalov
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  2. A. Y. Kondratev
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Correspondence to V. V. Mazalov.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © V.V. Mazalov, A.Y. Kondratev, 2013, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Priloszheniya, 2013, No. 2, pp. 46–63.

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Mazalov, V.V., Kondratev, A.Y. The bargaining solution among threshold strategies. Autom Remote Control 76, 507–520 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030157

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915030157

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