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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 74, Issue 3, pp 506–520 | Cite as

A model of institutional control

  • M. A. Gorelov
Large Scale Systems Control
  • 72 Downloads

Abstract

An hierarchical two-player game is analyzed. Player 1 delegates the right of choosing his strategies to the partner and controls the constraints imposed on the choice of the lower-level player. Moreover, the described model is shown to possess a connection to games admitting the exchange of (generally) untrue information.

Keywords

Remote Control Gain Function Uncertain Factor Institutional Control Control Decentralization 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • M. A. Gorelov
    • 1
  1. 1.Dorodnicyn Computing CentreRussian Academy of SciencesMoscowRussia

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