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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 74, Issue 3, pp 491–505 | Cite as

Optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms in active systems

  • A. K. Enaleev
Large Scale Systems Control

Abstract

We consider mechanisms in two-level active systems, where additional conditions of incentive compatibility are imposed on planning procedures and incentive schemes to coordinate preferences of agents and a principal. These conditions ensure plan fulfillment and truth-telling (strategy-proofness). Finally, sufficient conditions of optimal incentive-compatible mechanisms are established.

Keywords

Remote Control Penalty Function Maximal Growth Rate Incentive Scheme Incentive Compatibility 
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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2013

Authors and Affiliations

  • A. K. Enaleev
    • 1
  1. 1.Trapeznikov Institute of Control SciencesRussian Academy of SciencesMoscowRussia

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