Abstract
We consider a certain game-theoretic model of non-anonymous threshold conformity behavior over binary action sets of the players. For a given player, non-anonymity implies different level of confidence in the neighbors. The notions of conformity and autonomy are briefly analyzed; the corresponding game-theoretic threshold model is built to describe counteraction of these phenomena. Nash equilibria characterizing the conformity behavior are derived. Finally, characteristic conditions of the Nash equilibria are studied, and structure of the equilibria is described.
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Original Russian Text © V.V. Breer, 2010, published in Upravlenie Bol’shimi Sistemami, 2010, No. 31, pp. 162–176.
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Breer, V.V. A game-theoretic model of non-anonymous threshold conformity behavior. Autom Remote Control 73, 1256–1264 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117912070144
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117912070144