Abstract
Modern investigations dedicated to application of game theory methods to analyze different aspects of innovative activity are overviewed. The behavior of an innovative firm in competitive environment, strategies of transfer of rights to intellectual property objects, as well as ways of economic-organizing relations among participants of an innovative consortium and issues of innovative policy are considered.
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Original Russian Text © I.N. Dubina, 2010, published in Problemy Upravleniya, 2010, No. 4, pp. 2–11.
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Dubina, I.N. Foreign investigations in the field of game-theoretic analysis of innovations. Autom Remote Control 72, 1753–1765 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117911080145
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117911080145