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Automation and Remote Control

, Volume 72, Issue 1, pp 119–128 | Cite as

Manipulation in the division problem for two players

  • D. A. Shvarts
Control in Social Economic Systems
  • 38 Downloads

Abstract

In the division problem for two players it is assumed that one of them is honest and informs his true preferences. The second player knows in advance the preferences of the first player and he tends to use this information in the maximum beneficial way for himself. In essence, this article is the recommendation for the second player. Here, it turns out that the optimal strategy does not practically depend on the division procedure (if the latter is sufficiently reasonable, i.e., if at the given preference of the partners there exist fair divisions, the procedure suggests one of them).

Keywords

Remote Control Dispute Resolution Gain Function True Preference Equal Division 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Pleiades Publishing, Ltd. 2011

Authors and Affiliations

  • D. A. Shvarts
    • 1
  1. 1.Higher School of EconomicsState UniversityMoscowRussia

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